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Dimensions of the World Food Aid system1
In the past, food aid has been almost synonymous with
the United States PL 480 programme, and therefore
the greater part of the discussion of food aid, issues
and problems, has been concerned with the dominant
US programme and cereals, particularly wheat.
However, since the late 1960s there has been a
transformation of the pattern of food aid. Many of
these changes are at the 'donor end' and have received
as yet relatively limited attention.
First, the scale and share of the United States in total
food aid has declined substantially. Total PL 480
shipments declined from a total of 17.3 mn tons of
grains and 1.1 mn tons of other commodities in 1965
to a combined total of 3.3 mn tons in 1974, and have in
recent years averaged less than 6 mn tons. The US
share of food aid from OECD countries has fallen
from 94 per cent in 1965 to just under 50 per cent in
1980 (Table 1).
Second, the EEC through its programme of
'community action' administered by the Community
Commission and the bilateral activities of the member
states has come to be second only in relation to the US,
accounting for 27 per cent of OECD food aid in 1980.
The increasing significance of the EEC has also
brought a change in the commodity composition of
food aid. In terms of the cost of food aid as reported to
the DAC, EEC dairy aid currently represents
approximately 11 per cent of all OECD food aid.2 The
changing commodity composition of food aid has
implications in changing patterns of use. The bulk of
dairy products are supplied for nutrition projects and
to support dairy industry development in recipient
countries. The largest and most widely known of these
dairy projects is Operation Flood in India which
accounted for approximately 24 per cent of allocations
under the 1982 EEC dairy programme.
'This paper is an expanded version of a discussion of 'Donor policy
issues' in the report on the IDS Food Aid Seminar, Jan-Feb 1982
[Clay and Pryer 1982].
'Dairy products accounted for some 60 per cent of allocations for food
transfers by Community Action under the aid component, Title IX,
of the Community budget between 1978 and 1982.
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Third, there has been a simultaneous proliferation of
donors institutionalised through the Food Aid
Convention (see article by Parotte in this Bulletin) and
contributions to the multilateral programmes, parti-
cularly WFP and IEFR. The annual cereals
commitments of most donors other than the US
approximates to their obligations under the FAC
(Table 2). Excepting Japan, they also regularly
allocate a higher proportion of their aid than the USA
to multilateral channels (Table 1). The advent of the
'smaller' food aid donors potentially raises problems
of programming from the viewpoint of the donor and
recipient, which are developed more fully below.
Fourth, there has been a parallel growth in the number
of recipient countries. The January 1982 FAO Food
Aid Bulletin lists 100 recipients of cereals food aid in
1980/81 and notes 'other unspecified minor shipments
to several other countries and territories'. Taking
account of the proliferation of donors and recipients
and the increasingly wide range of project as well as
programme uses of food aid, it is apparent that an
enormously complex international system of transfers
of largely perishable commodities has evolved over a
decade. As the bulk of these transfers involve bilateral
relationships between individual donors and recipients
it is not surprising that the 'world food aid system' is
being criticised for:
the complex political and economic relationships
that it involves;
the enormous number of management and
logistical problems it has created.
Fifth, the proportion of assistance going to low
income countries, and in particular to sub-Saharan
Africa, has increased (Table 3). This shift is in part a
deliberate policy response to the perception in aid
agencies and donor countries that these countries
contain the bulk of the world's hungry people.
Congressional amendments to US food aid legislation
now require that 75 per cent of programme food aid
under PL 480 Title I go to low income countries
eligible for IDA credits. The implications of this shift
are exemplified at the country level by Indonesia, a
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Table 1
Food aid flows by type of transaction of OECD countries in 1980
(US$ million)
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Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, 1981,
Development Co-operation 1981 Review.
Note: 'own estimate. The multilateral contributions of individual member states as reported by the DAC include national estimates of 'contributions'
to the financing of EEC Community action;
2 own estimates - DAC reports $10.0 mn of gross disbursements by Japan, in addition to the sub-totals for grant, loans and multilateral
contributions.
country relatively less constrained by balance of
payments problems: the US has reduced and the EEC
has phased out cereals and butter oil food aid. This
shift is also in part a consequence of donor emergency
responses to disasters and temporary food crises
which have come to be long term commitments to new
refugee communities and countries without immediate
prospects of a return to previously higher levels of self
provision in food staples, such as Mauritania and
Somalia.
However, this change of priority is also intensifying
the problems of programming and utilisation of food
aid commodities. The low income countries have more
intractable balance of payment problems, and also
frequently more serious deficiencies in management
and transport, storage, distribution systems. Their
total import requirements are frequently small and
therefore involve relatively higher unit costs in
administration and shipping [Clay and Singer l982J.
food aid (net disbursements)
Many of the problems of food aid relationships, when
viewed from either a donor or recipient perspective,
can be seen as arising from the complexity and lack of
coherence of the 'world food aid system'. From the
perspective of a recipient country, the mere
programming of food aid involves a sequence of
annual negotiations, with potentially at least half a
dozen multilateral and bilateral agencies, over a range
of commodities, available under a complex set of
terms and conditions relating to logistics, use and
financial terms and conditions.
Broadly, the donor-end problems of programming
and supplying food aid again arise from the
'The inevitability of high transport costs is indicated by the large
number of recipient countries, 38 out of 100, to which even the total
supply of cereals food aid in 1980/81 was too small, less than 12,000
tonnes, to justify low cost charter shipment, ie on the assumption that
all the aid was supplied in one shipment from a single source (FAO
FoodAidButtelin no 3, 1983, Table 2).
Australia 38.7 0.0 25.3 64.0 2.4
Austria 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.1
Canada 76.0 2.5 86.3 164.7 6.3
EEC 'national actions' (176.0) (0.0) (103.7)' (279.7) (10.7)
EEC 'Community actions' (275.5)' (0.0) (161.4)' (436.9) (16.7)'
EEC total 451.5' 0.0 265.1' 716.6 27.4'
Finland 0.0 0.0 4.2 4.2 0.2
Japan 12.8 206.3 42.2 261.32 10.0
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.03
Norway 0.4 0.0 21.9 22.3 0.9
Sweden 7.7 0.0 39.5 47.2 1.8
Switzerland 15.8 0.0 12.1 27.9 1.1
United States 471.0 687.0 149.0 1,307.0 49.9
Total 1,073.9' 895.8 649.1' 2,618.7 100.0
grants loans contributions to total donor total
international as percentage
institutions of tot alfood
$ million aid
Table 2
Cereals food aid: donor commitments under 1980 Food Aid Convention and actual shipments 1980/81
Source: j) FAO FoodAidBulletin nc 1 1982
ii) Food Aid Convention 1980
Note: for 1980/81 The European Community Council decided that 928,000 tonnes should be allocated to 'Community actions', and 722,000 tonnes
to 'national actions'.
This is an internal Community decision.
* Other cereals food aid under 1971 FAC was also shipped in 1980,'Sl.
complexity of food aid relationships. Potentially each
donor agency is confronted with the problems of
determining the scale of assistance and allocating and
supplying several commodities. Each agency has to
relate its programme to multilateral activities (WFP,
International Emergency Food Reserve [IEFR],
International Committee for Red Cross, etc), and to a
potentially very large group of recipient countries. At
the same time, each agency needs to take account of
the actions of other donors.
Donor Roles and Perspectives:
the United States
The implications of the halving of the level of US food
transfers and the related relative reduction in the
overall role of the US as a food aid donor provides a
major theme of this article. The other change in the
context of US policy and programming is the degree to
which the scale and broad allocation of food transfers
is now more heavily circumscribed by legislative
provisions made in the aftermath of the Vietnam war.
These modifications of Public Law 480 have been
designed to give a developmental and humanitarian
focus to the US food aid programme. The evolution of
policy is well documented by Wallerstein [1980] and
we have considered elsewhere some of the policy
implications of these changes particularly for
programme food aid, largely provided as highly
concessional loans under PL 480 Title I [Clay and
Singer 1982J.
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(000 tonnes, cereal equivalent)
commitments under actual shipments
donor countries 1980 FA C cereals food aid 1980/81
000 tonnes % of total 000 tonnes % of total
Argentina 35 0.5 50 0.6
Australia 400 5.3 394 4.7
Austria 20 0.3 17 0.2
Canada 600 7.9 600 7.1
China 25 0.3
EEC 1,650 21.7 1,100 13.1
Finland 20 0.3 20 0.2
India 51 0.6
Japan 300 3.9 567 6.7
Norway 30 0.4 31 0.4
Saudi Arabia 31 0.4
Spain 20 0.3 14 0.2
Sweden 40 0.5 91 1.1
Switzerland 27 0.4 16 0.2
Turkey 15 0.2
United States 4,470 58.7 5,216 62.0
WFP purchases 13 0.2
Other 166 2.0
Total 7,612 100.0 8,417* 100.0
Table 3
Cereals food aid: regional patterns of distribution 1974/75-1980/81'
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Source: FAO Food Aid Bullet ins
Notes: 'cereals converted to wheat equivalent according to rules of Food Aid Convention. The regional groupings are approximately those of the
UN Regional Commissions except that South Asia, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is
defined as a separate region;
2 refers mainly to cereals channelled through UN agencies for which no country breakdown is available. Includes also minor shipments to
several other countries and territories.
Perhaps the most important point to note is the extent
to which both 'outsiders' and many 'insiders' in the US
policy process (in congress as well as the admini-
stration) have not, at least until recently, come to
terms explicitly and more fully with the policy
implications of having to programme food aid in a
multi-donor context where the US is only primus inter
pares. Ironically, the myth of US food power was given
unsubtie expression originally, particularly by US
Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, in the early 1970s.
This myth as applied to food aid, taken up by
commentators on Third World policy, only too happy
to attribute a large share of the difficulties of many
governments out of accord with Washington to US
food aid, gained credibility, ironically, at the moment
of collapse of what had been for two decades a wholly
US dominated world food aid system.
The notion that US food aid is a potential weapon of
awful significance is no longer plausible given the
changed structure of the food aid system and world
food markets. At the grandest level this has been
illustrated by the debacle of the Soviet grain embargo
over Afghanistan. However, the scope for exerting
leverage through the food weapon is limited in relation
to the many recipients of food aid. Thus, the many
small recipients in Africa whose imports are marginal
in relation to total food aid and the programmes of
most donors, have alternative sources of concessional
supply. An examination of food aid flows also shows
that the relative significance of any one donor varies
sharply from country to country with, for example, the
EEC, Australia and even Sweden, being in particular
years the major source of concessional supply
[Clay 1982].
Those Third World countries, such as Bangladesh and
Egypt, whose normal or emergency food import
requirements are non-marginal in relation to
individual donor programmes or total food aid, are
unable to meet a significant part of their import billon
concessional terms on any regular basis without US
participation. But recent experience has underscored
sub-Saharan 958 11.2 752 11.0 869 9.8 1325 14.4 1174 12.4 1603 18.0 2289 27.3
Africa
West Asia and 972 11.4 1299 19.0 2669 30.2 2520 27.3 2644 27.8 2260 25.4 2272 27.1
North Africa
South Asia 4612 54.0 3351 49.0 2809 31.8 2516 27.3 2586 27.2 2339 26.2 1747 20.8
EastAsiaand 910 10.6 600 8.8. 1831 20.7 1971 21.4 2016 21.2 1524 17.1 1135 13.5
Pacific
Central and 596 7.0 538 7.9 243 2.7 372 4.0 605 6.4 718 8.1 564 6.7
South Americas




348 4.0 131 1.9 126 1.4 75 0.8 80 0.8 143 1.6 105 1.2
Total 8544 100.0 6846 100.0 8840 100.0 9217 100.0 9500 100.0 8910 100.0 8396 100.0
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81
region 000 % 000 % 000 % 000 % 000 % 000 % 000 %
tonnes total tonnes total tonnes total tonnes total tonnes total tonnes total tonnes total
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Near Pokhara, Nepal, EEC food aid is carried up to the mountains.
the complexity of such relationships and the restricted
scope provided for leverage by the aid donor. The
political context of large-scale food transfers to Egypt
limits the scope for conditionality in relation to
specific areas, particularly economic policy, in
bilateral relationships.
Bangladesh also demonstrated that it could meet
considerably enhanced food import requirements
during a food crisis in 1978/79 precipitated by
weather-related poor harvests by resorting to imports
on a wide range of conditions from a variety of
sources, despite a temporary suspension of US food
aid. This period of difficulty in Bangladesh-US aid
relationships had arisen because the Bangladesh
Government had failed to satisfy conditions on
incentive prices for domestic food producers made
under a new Title III (food aid for development)
programme.4 This food and food aid crisis placed
considerable strain on the financial and managerial
resources of the Bangladesh Government, but
demonstrated that even a country highly dependent on
food aid can find freedom of manoeuvre in its
relationships with aid donors (see below). This
experience is also a cautionary tale for simplistic
advocates of attaching heavy agricultural price
conditionality to agreements in the current round of
economic adjustment and negotiations with food
deficit countries.
Donor Roles and Perspectives:
the Other Donors
The programmes of the other mostly smaller donors
are heterogeneous in terms of scale, commodity
composition, balance of bilateral and multilateral
commitments. The first problem for the food aid
donor is that there are no obvious criteria for
determining the scale and commodity composition of
a programme in terms of food import requirements of
developing countries. Countries seem to have
institutionalised programmes of varying size according
to essentially political assessment under the FAC,
taking account of national comparative advantage or
disadvantage in food exporting. Similar negotiation
processes have resulted in institutionalising multi-
lateral commitments within joint donor commitments
against international targets, eg FAC, IEFR, WFP
etc. The essentially political nature of these decisions
at the level of the individual donor is indicated by the
procedures of the Canadian and Australian Govern-
ments. The total annual levels of cereal food aid are
based on the negotiated commitments under the Food
Aid Convention. In recent relatively tight commodity
markets the availability of grain to meet commitments
cannot be taken for granted. The national grain
40n the 'new' Title III provisions of PL 480, see ADC [1979].
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marketing authorities in each country are therefore
obliged to earmark grain against FAC commitments
to prevent all supplies being exported through
commercial channels. In reviewing the food aid
actions of the 'smaller' donors there is no longer an
obvious close short-term relationship between food
aid and disposal of surplus cereals.
The 'smaller' donor agency is confronted with difficult
problems of allocating what are relatively small
volumes of aid in relation to the import requirements
of low income countries to a large number of potential
recipient countries. The Scandinavian countries have
resolved this problem by allocating their aid largely
through multilateral channels and, in the case of
Sweden, channelling food aid, along with almost all
other bilateral assistance, to a small number of
countries, selected for their constructive development
policies. In recent years Sweden has been one of the
most important suppliers to Mozambique, indicating
how even a relatively small donor can also play a
significant role in relation to countries with small
import requirements.
Australia and the EEC, who allocate the major part of
their food aid bilaterally, find themselves confronted
with difficult problems. Both have explored the use of
objective statistical allocation rules. The EEC
Commission has, for example, employed per capita
income criteria to determine country eligibility for aid
with transport costs also met by the Community.
Donors would like to find more satisfactory ways of
balancing needs, other aid policy objectives and cost
effectiveness, but current ad hoc practice indicates a
general lack of satisfaction with concepts of need or
food aid requirements arrived at from juggling theper
capita income, population size, state of malnutrition,
scale of food deficits etc. For all the donor countries
with bilateral programmes are also engaged in the
difficult balancing act of rationalising their overall
programme of allocations whilst taking into account
the needs of specific countries and the actions of other
donors.
In looking at the role of food aid in relation to the food
problems of individual countries food insecurity,
malnutrition and economic adjustment faced by
individual countries - there is a discernible trend
towards multiannual programming, consistent pack-
ages of food aid, perhaps arrived at within a donor
consortium, such as that for Mali. Yet it is clear that
there is a real tension between the desire to achieve
more rational, overall allocation of food aid, and
moves towards tailoring all food aid allocations to
circumstances of individual countries and integration
with other assistance.
The current patterns of donors' programmes reflect a
balance of geographical and political considerations
and an ad hoc response to what is perceived to be the
food aid priority countries. EEC food aid programmes
have included large allocations to a small number of
densely settled low income countries - Bangladesh,
Egypt, Pakistan and India (dairy products), with a
large number of small allocations, virtually all going
to the Lomé group of countries. Australian bilateral
assistance is largely concentrated on African and
Asian countries around the Indian Ocean basin. The
Canadian programme in general, currently goes to
high priority countries and those with very large
import requirements.
Multilateral Commitments
The comparison of current procedures revealed a wide
range of practices amongst donors in terms of the way
they meet and domestically budget their bilateral
commitments [Clay and Pryer 1982:44-5]. These
commitments are institutionalised only by informal
convention. Many smaller agency programmes are
geared to channelling a large proportion of their FAC
commitments through multilateral agencies and to do
otherwise would present serious short-term admini-
strative problems of organising alternative outlets.
Multilateral programmes involving a high proportion
of longer term nutritional and development projects
remain highly vulnerable to changes in bilateral donor
policy. This was demonstrated when the new US
administration in 1981 considered abandoning the
conventional practice of meeting 25 per cent of WFP
requirements.
Non-Cereals Food Aid Programmes
There are no institutionalised commitments com-
parable to the grains Food Aid Convention. The EEC
Programme has its origins in surplus disposal
problems of the early 1970s. The Community has since
come close to institutionalising its dairy programme at
levels of 150,000 tonnes of dried skimmed milk and
45,000 tonnes of butter oil under its 'community
actions' programme without regard to year to year
market conditions. The rationale for a programme of
this scale, more than 10 per cent of all food aid, as a
development transfer is now being called in question
(see the statement by the British Foreign Secretary and
Tony Jackson's recent assessments of EEC food aid in
this Bulletin).
Vegetable oils have been the most important non-
cereals food transfer from the USA, usually in excess
of 200,000 tonnes annually, in recent years. These
transfers are largely bilateral highly concessional
loans under PL 480 Title I. In addition, there are a
range of grant transfers linked to nutritional
programmes of voluntary agencies and multilateral
agencies. These programmes, like so much of food aid,
appear to have become institutionalised both by many
years of operation and quantitative commitments of
support to this complex of project and emergency aid
actions under PL 480 Title II. The commodity
composition of Title II has, like EEC aid, recently
come under close scrutiny [National Research Council
1982].
Australia and Canada currently make annual
financial allocations of non-cereals food aid, currently
Australian dollars 4.14 mn and Canadian dollars
2 mn. In the past, Canadian commitments of dairy
food aid have reflected changing levels of commodity
surpluses.
Many programmes include quite small quantities of
processed cereal, dairy and other commodities. So far,
none of the donors has attempted to establish rational
allocation criteria comparable to those for cereals.
Non-cereals food aid is an area which requires
extensive evaluation and analysis to establish overall
priorities and to identify ways of increasing
programme effectiveness (see articles by Maxwell and
Jackson in this Bulletin).
For references see page 61.
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